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Seabrook: A Case Study in
Mismanagement
Irvin C. Bupp
The Seabrook nuclear power plant construction project is an unqualified financial
disaster. It simultaneously threatens its chief owner, the Public Service Co. ofNew
Hampshire (PSNH) with bankruptcy and the company's electricity customers with huge
rate increases. The fifteen-year history of the project is reviewed to identify "what went
wrong?"
The review suggests that the basic problem has been mismanagement by both PSNH
and by government regulators. A three-year regulatory imbroglio over the environ-
mental effects of the plant's cooling system was extremely costly in the mid-1970s.
By the time this problem was belatedly resolved, the project had begun to outstrip
the financial resources of its owners. These resources were seriously weakened by a
political battle over how to pay for construction costs.
By the end of the 1970s, the risks ofproceeding with Seabrook were beginning to
exceed the benefits. PSNH management, however, chose to accept these risks, in effect
betting their company that the project could be completed.
Underlying many of Seabrook' s problems are certain federal nuclear regulatory pol-
icies and practices whose roots go all the way back to the Eisenhower administration.
These policies are also briefly reviewed.
Ten years ago nuclear power was advertised as an important part of America's strategy
to deal with OPEC and rising oil prices. Today, however, many Americans face the
prospect of huge increases, not decreases, in their electricity bills as new nuclear power
plants are brought into service. Other Americans have seen the value of their invest-
ments in the stocks and bonds of electric power companies that are building nuclear
power plants shrink to a small fraction of their previous value. In New England, the
customers of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) are in the former
group and the company's creditors and shareholders are in the latter. The cause of these
problems is the Seabrook project. Seabrook is a partially built, 2,300,000 kilowatt
nuclear generating station whose principal owner is PSNH. Today, Seabrook stands as
an unqualified financial catastrophe, simultaneously threatening PSNH with bankruptcy
and the company's customers with staggering electric power costs.
The following article reviews the fifteen-year history of Seabrook, highlighting cer-
tain key actions and the decisions of both PSNH and federal and state regulatory author-
ities that led to this catastrophe. 1 This review shows that there is no simple answer to
/. C. Bupp is Director of Utilities and Energy Management , Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Cambridge
,
Massachusetts.
the question "what went wrong?" But it also suggests that a large part of the answer is
captured by a simple concept: mismanagement. Both PSNH executives and regulators at
times failed to do their jobs efficiently and effectively. Government agency policy shifts
hindered the project's early years. Although PSNH management may, too, have made
some early errors in judgement, their truly costly decisions were made in the last four
years. Since at least 1980, Seabrook's owners have had clear warnings of the financial
disaster that is now happening. Unlike the owners of other partially built nuclear power
plants, they have not responded to these warnings by abandoning the project in order to
lessen the impact of the ensuing financial damage.
Nuclear Power in New England
As a preliminary to a discussion of Seabrook, some general background information
about nuclear power in New England will be helpful.
Nearly three-quarters of the nuclear power plants that are currently operating in the
United States were ordered before the 1970s. The majority of these plants were ordered
during the heady years of unalloyed optimism about nuclear power, between 1965 and
1968. 2 Although there were already some apparently unsettled questions about the
potential dangers of large nuclear power plants, these questions came from persons or
organizations that at the time seemed to hold opinions contrary to technical and eco-
nomic "facts." These facts were essentially unanimously agreed upon within the con-
temporary business and government establishment; accordingly, America's leaders,
indeed the world's leaders, fully concurred that nuclear power was both cheap and safe.
Incorporated in 1926 as a consolidation of several smaller power and light compa-
nies, PSNH, over the following years, acquired about twenty additional small electric
utilities to become the largest utility in New Hampshire, serving the needs of a growing
number of customers. In the late 1960s very high population growth was forecasted for
New Hampshire during the 1970s and 1980s, thus increasing electric power needs.
Most estimates indicated 3.5 to 4.0 percent annual growth rates accompanied by corre-
spondingly high demands for electricity. PSNH staff members were predicting elec-
tricity demand growth of 7 percent throughout the 1970s and few, if any, informed
persons would have quarreled with them. 3
PSNH's prior experience with nuclear power, while limited, had been extremely sat-
isfactory. Moreover, given the concurrence at the time over relative safety and expense,
it was not surprising that nuclear power came under consideration as a possible solution
to these potential rising demands for electricity. Hence, the initial decision by PSNH
management in 1969 to "go nuclear" was neither surprising nor controversial. In the
late 1950s, a consortium of New England utilities, with financial help from the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), built a pioneer nuclear power plant. The
Yankee plant, a 188,000 kilowatt facility located in western Massachusetts, began oper-
ating in 1960 and subsequently proved to be remarkably reliable. PSNH owned 7 per-
cent of Yankee. In addition, the company owned 4 percent of Connecticut Yankee, a
565,000 kilowatt nuclear power plant also built with United States government aid.
Connecticut Yankee became operative in 1967 and also had a good performance record.
Both Yankee plants were tremendous bargains for PSNH. For an investment of only
about $10 million, the company owned approximately 100,000 kilowatts of reliable
generating capacity.
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In 1969 the management of PSNH decided to build a nuclear generating facility at
Newington, near Portsmouth. However, the USAEC rejected the company's application
for a construction permit on the grounds that the proposed site was too close to Pease
Air Force Base. The USAEC ruled that the risk of a B-52 bomber, which carried
nuclear bombs, accidently crashing into the generating plant was unacceptably high.
The agency prohibited PSNH from building a nuclear power plant within a ten-mile
radius of Pease, thereby eliminating several alternative sites that had been selected by
the company. An extensive search for an acceptable site lasted two years and culmi-
nated in 1972. A site was chosen several miles from the town of Seabrook on New
Hampshire's eighteen-mile Atlantic coastline. Four reasons were given for selecting
Seabrook: the ocean was a convenient source of cooling water for the power plant; the
site was accessible by barge, which would help minimize construction costs; the site
62 was reasonably close to the company's major electricity demand centers; and the site
offered a stable granite foundation.
PSNH awarded an $80 million contract to Westinghouse to build two 1,150,000 kilo-
watt nuclear steam supply systems. Company spokespersons said that the first of the
two units would be completed by 1979 and the second by 1981. The Seabrook Nuclear
Station would supply 70 percent of New Hampshire's electric power needs during the
early 1980s at a cost estimated to be 60 percent cheaper than oil and 30 percent cheaper
than coal. These plans were presented to a Seabrook town meeting and were met with
an enthusiastic response as the town selectmen noted the significant revenue benefits to
the community. Those at the town meeting unanimously approved the PSNH plan.
The 1972 population of Seabrook was about five thousand during the winter, when
it was chiefly a fishing port, and about six thousand in the summer, due to tourism.
Behind the town's rather rocky beaches were salt marshes and tidal estuaries serving as
a habitat for a variety of marine life and birds.
During the months following the plan's approval, however, local opposition to the
Seabrook nuclear power plant began to develop among a diverse assortment of groups.
Numerous questions such as the following were raised: Would the nuclear plant hurt the
town's tourist business? Would it promote further industrialization of the scenic New
Hampshire coastline? Was the plant being built too close to an old earthquake fault?
Was the electricity from the plant really necessary? One question, however, soon
stood out as an especially troublesome one for PSNH. What would be the effects of the
plant's "cooling water" discharge on the local marine ecology?
The Cooling Tunnel Imbroglio
After pressurized steam passes through the power-producing turbines of any steam-
driven electrical generating plant, that steam must be condensed into liquid before it can
be sent back to the plant's boiler. Some "heat sink"—in practice, relatively cool water
—must be available to absorb enough heat from the steam to condense it.
PSNH had two alternatives in solving Seabrook 's "heat sink" problem. After con-
densing the steam, the now relatively warm ocean cooling water could be sprayed into
500-foot cooling towers where its heat would, in turn, be dissipated into the air. How-
ever, since some of this water would evaporate into the heated air, a mist of rain would
form as the air later cooled. Because the plant was so close to the ocean, this rain
would contain salt that threatened to harm the environment. Because of this, the AEC
determined that cooling towers were not acceptable at the Seabrook site. This decision
meant that PSNH would have to use the ocean as the heat sink for its nuclear power
plant. The company's plan called for the construction of two 19-foot-diameter tunnels,
each running 1.5 miles into the ocean. One tunnel would draw in more than one billion
gallons of water per day and the other would discharge an equal volume, at a tempera-
ture about forty degrees warmer than the intake stream.
In early 1975 the Seacoast Antipollution League argued against the cooling tunnel
plan in hearings before John McGlennon, the regional administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The League's witnesses contended that
the discharge of hot water into the ocean would endanger shellfish and other marine life.
Witnesses for PSNH disagreed. In June 1975 McGlennon approved the cooling tunnel
plan. Thirteen months later, the AEC's successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), issued a construction permit for the Seabrook facility and work began at the
site. But the Seacoast Antipollution League and others who opposed the plant refused to 63
give up. They appealed to McGlennon to reverse his initial decision and in November
1976 he did so, on the grounds that the cooling tunnels would cause unacceptable dam-
age to the local marine environment. This decision about the cooling tunnels meant that
the NRC was obliged to rescind Seabrook's construction permit, which it did on Janu-
ary 21, 1977. Four days later, however, the NRC suspended its own order, stating that
the matter raised complex legal and policy questions that had ramifications for other
nuclear construction projects. However, after subsequent public hearings, and about a
month of deliberation, the NRC again canceled Seabrook's construction permit and
ruled that PSNH would have to get the approval of the EPA director for the cooling
tunnels in order to regain its permit to resume construction.
In June 1977 EPA Director Douglas Costle overturned his regional administrator's
decision, determining that the tunnels were environmentally sound after all. This new
decision cleared the way for construction to restart on August 1 . The Seacoast Anti-
pollution League took Costle 's decision to the federal courts. In October 1977 the
United States Court of Appeals in Boston denied the League's petition for a stay.
Meanwhile, the NRC reversed its 1972 position on cooling towers, saying that this al-
ternative to tunnels was now acceptable if the EPA decided that they were necessary.
But the Seacoast Antipollution League had not exhausted its rights in court. The Court
of Appeals decision was successfully appealed to the United States First Circuit Court.
In February 1978 the Circuit Court overturned Costle, holding that he had based his
decision on evidence presented outside the record, and hence unavailable to the environ-
mentalists for cross-examination. The entire matter was sent back to the EPA directors
for reconsideration. Yet again, the Seacoast Antipollution League asked the NRC to
withdraw Seabrook's permits, and on July 21, 1978, the NRC obliged. Two weeks later,
Costle again found the cooling tunnels to be environmentally sound, and on August 10,
1978, work resumed on Seabrook for the third time in a little over two years.
In effect, the imbroglio over the cooling tunnels had paralyzed the Seabrook project
for three years—from June 1975 to August 1978. The delay was costly: Seabrook was
originally supposed to cost approximately $900 million. PSNH's share of approximately
$450 million, reflecting its 50 percent ownership of the project, though large relative to
the company's financial resources, was well within its means. Yet during the period of
delay caused by the regulatory impasse, Seabrook's estimated cost rose alarmingly,
reaching some $2 billion during 1976. The project's critics began to focus on costs and
found a receptive public in New Hampshire.
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The New Hampshire Public Utility Commission (PUC) was allowing PSNH to
include a portion of Seabrook's construction costs in its rate base, thereby significantly
lightening the financial burden on the company. In May 1977 the commission granted
PSNH a 20 percent rate increase, half of which was attributed to Seabrook. The result
of the increase was a sharp public outcry. In response, the state legislature passed a bill
prohibiting Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) for retail power sales in New Hamp-
shire. Governor Meldrim Thomson vetoed the bill and in the 1978 gubernatorial cam-
paign, Thomson's opponent, Hugh Gallen, made CWIP for PSNH a major issue.
Bumper stickers proclaimed: Whip CWIP — Vote Gallen. Gallen was elected, and
shortly thereafter he signed new anti-CWIP legislation. By the spring of 1979, PSNH
management had evidently decided that without CWIP the company could no longer
support its 50 percent share of Seabrook. In March a spokesman announced that the
64 company would try to reduce its ownership by at least 20 percent. He also announced
that the project was now estimated to cost $2.6 billion. Seabrook was clearly already in
deep trouble.
One of Seabrook's problems was the real technical uncertainty about the precise
effects of warm water from the tunnels on local marine life. Moreover, these effects had
potential commercial significance on local industry. Of course, it is possible that John
McGlennon, a lawyer who had frank political ambitions, made decisions motivated by
political considerations. It is also possible that his boss, Costle, was similarly motivated.
Both men may have played "fast and loose" with scientific data and opinion to serve
political ends. The key point, however, is that the range of disagreement among experts
on the basic technical issue of cooling towers was wide enough to sustain contradictory
policy conclusions. Hence, it is equally possible that both McGlennon and Costle were
honestly trying to make the most responsible decision they could in the face of technical
uncertainty. Indeed, throughout the thirty-year fight over nuclear power, such behavior
by public officials has been the rule, not the exception.
The February 1978 United States Court of Appeals decision illustrates another
important feature of the way the administrative and legal system has dealt with techni-
cal uncertainty. The court's decision was entirely based on procedural, not substantive,
issues. This situation is also typical of nuclear safety and environmental litigation. 4 The
courts are extremely reluctant to second-guess the technical judgements of administra-
tive agencies like the EPA or NRC. In 1978 the Court of Appeals did not rule on the
question of whether tunnels were acceptable. It merely ruled that Costle had used inap-
propriate procedures for reaching his own decision.
The Three Mile Island Accident Aftermath
In March 1979 the prospects for selling 30 percent of Seabrook seemed bright. The
Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (MMWEC), a consortium of
thirty-one small municipal power companies, offered to buy 14 percent, bringing its
total ownership up to 20 percent. Several other small out-of-state utility companies
expressed interest in shares totaling about 8 percent. New Hampshire wholesale utility
companies were also potential buyers. Then came the accident at Three Mile Island
(TMI) nuclear power plant, which began on March 29. In its aftermath, outside interest
in purchasing part of Seabrook rapidly died down. In October MMWEC executives
notified PSNH management that their consortium would only be able to increase its
ownership by a maximum of 6 percent. The PUC barred PSNH from selling shares to
New Hampshire wholesale utilities and ordered the company to retain at least a 28
percent interest in Seabrook. In November, PSNH still held 35 percent and had few
realistic prospects for further sales. Part of the problem was that United Illuminating
Company of Connecticut, Seabrook' s second largest owner, was trying to sell half of its
own 20 percent share. In March 1980 PSNH raised the cost estimate for Seabrook to
$3.2 billion, attributing much of the increase to design changes needed to comply with
findings of the government commissions that had investigated the TMI accident.
By 1980 the financial implications of Seabrook had become potentially catastrophic
for PSNH. To understand how grave the situation had become, consider the approxi-
mate and simplified 1980 income data for PSNH shown in Table 1.
Table 1




Fuel and Other Operating
Expenses - 248








Other Net Income 12
Total Net Income (earnings) 60
Source: PSNH Annual Report, 1980
The critical item is the $72 million addition labeled Allowance for Funds Used During
Construction (AFUDC) to the category of operating income.
Most state public utility regulatory authorities forbid companies under their jurisdic-
tions from earning a return on plant and equipment unless the facilities are "used and
useful"—that is, operating. The basic rationale is that without such a prohibition util-
ities would over-invest in plant and equipment to the benefit of shareholders and the
detriment of customers. The "used and useful" concept has deep roots in United States
regulatory policy, going back to the first attempts to regulate railroads in the nineteenth
century. The 1977-78 fight between the New Hampshire Legislature and Governor
Thomson was only a recent battle in a war that has raged in American politics for more
than a century. The war continues today.
Over the decades, however, the utilities have consolidated an important victory.
While they are not typically permitted to include CWIP (or at least most of CWIP) in
their rate bases, they are allowed to report a noncash addition to their incomes. In 1980
PSNH added to its reported earnings an amount equal to the hypothetical return that its
investors would have received on the funds invested in CWIP if the assets represented
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by CWIP had actually produced revenues during 1980. This noncash credit to the com-
pany's income statement is balanced by a corresponding debit to the CWIP account on
its balance sheet. 5
The key point is that PSNH's $72 million addition was not a cash inflow to the com-
pany. It is analogous to the $17 million in reported depreciation expenses. PSNH nei-
ther paid out $17 million in cash on depreciation nor took in $72 million as AFUDC. It
is important to note that this $72 million was more than 90 percent of the company's
total reported earnings.
PSNH's cash earnings for 1980 were $23 million ($78 million plus $17 million
minus $72 million). Yet in the same year the company paid $13 million in preferred
stock dividends and $35 million in common stock dividends. These payments of $48
million certainly did represent a real cash outflow. On top of this, PSNH spent $161
66 million in capital markets. Table 2 summarizes the results:
Table 2







Construction Costs - 233
External Financing 200
Sub Total (33)
Decrease in Working Capital (76)
Source: PSNH Annual Report, 1980
By 1980 PSNH management was liquidating their company in order to finish Sea-
brook. By doing so they were taking an appalling risk, for they were effectively betting
their company that the project would be finished at approximately the cost and schedule
then estimated. Yet all past evidence clearly pointed to the near inevitability of further
cost increases and delays. The point of no return was rapidly approaching.
In 1980 PSNH's "writing off" of the sunk costs of Seabrook would have been finan-
cially painful but hardly fatal. At worst, common stock dividends would have been
foregone for some period. But as the cost of the company's investment grew during the
coming years, as management should have known it would, the threat of failure to ever
finish Seabrook would become an increasingly mortal blow for PSNH as a going busi-
ness concern.
The Financial Fiascoes of the 1980s
During 1981 and 1982, management's liquidation of PSNH accelerated. In 1982 PSNH
had a cash deficit of more than $35 million, yet paid common and preferred dividends
of $75 million. The project's costs had, predictably, continued to rise, reaching $3.6
billion by the end of 1981. On January 12, 1982, the New Hampshire PUC ordered
PSNH to sell its 4 percent share in the partially built Millstone 3 nuclear power plant in
Connecticut and gave the company six months to lower its Seabrook stake to 28 per-
cent; otherwise, PUC said, it would order cancellation of unit #2. Three days later,
PSNH's bond and preferred stock ratings fell "below investment grade," an ignominy
shared at the time by only two other utilities: General Public Utilities (GPU), the owner
of TMI, and United Illuminating, PSNH's largest partner in Seabrook. On January 18
the PUC ordered an immediate halt to construction work on unit #2. PSNH responded
by taking the commission to court in December 1982, and the state supreme court over-
turned the PUC order. PSNH promptly announced that work on unit #2 would continue
at a reduced rate, but that total project costs were now estimated to be $5.25 billion,
mainly because of added interest charges. 6






PSNH now was probably beyond the point of no return, with unit #1 standing no
more than two-thirds completed and unit #2 less than one-quarter finished. In August
1983, the Connecticut PUC ordered the state's two Seabrook owners (Connecticut
Powerlight Company and United Illuminating Company) to stop all payments for work
on unit #2. In September 1983, PSNH halted all construction work on unit #2 "indefi-
nitely"; and in March 1984 United Engineers and Constructors, the architectural engi-
neering firm in charge of building Seabrook, informed PSNH that the total cost of the
two units would be $10.1 billion.
In a subsequent public statement, PSNH "rejected" the $10.1 billion figure, claiming
that the total project cost would not exceed $6.9 billion. Shortly thereafter, owners
accounting for 59 percent of Seabrook voted to cancel unit #2. The project's joint own-
ers' agreement, however, gave PSNH veto power over this decision, which the com-
pany's management promptly exercised. Then, two weeks later, in April 1984, PSNH
management acted on their own initiative under the terms of the joint owners' agree-
ment and ordered all work indefinitely halted on unit #1. Meanwhile, a management
consulting firm that had been retained by the Massachusetts Attorney General testified
before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) that a "minimum best
case" additional cost to complete unit #1 alone was $2.5 billion. A more realistic
figure, the firm testified, was $3 billion, completion to take at least two and one-half
years from the time work resumed.
In 1972 when PSNH embarked on the Seabrook project, its debt and preferred stock
were rated a solid A, and the company was a healthy public utility in a high-growth
service territory. Thirteen years and more than $2 billion later, the company is stuck
with a 36 percent share of a half-built $5.25 billion project that threatens to cause bank-
ruptcy unless it is finished and the company's customers begin to pay for it. Meanwhile
PSNH debt and preferred stock threaten to run the firm into bankruptcy; its debt and
preferred stock were rated well below investment grade, and over 27 million common
shares had been issued, constituting a dilution of several hundred percent. Dividend
payments on these shares have for several years been classified as "return of capital."
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What Went Wrong
The roots of the Seabrook debacle go back to the very beginning of commercial nuclear
power in the United States; indeed, the seeds were planted nearly forty years ago. 7 In
1947 a new and uniquely powerful government agency was created and given full re-
sponsibility for developing the technology of atomic energy for both military and civil-
ian purposes. For approximately the first ten years of its existence, however, the United
States Atomic Energy Commission's top officials spent nearly all of their time and
nearly all of the agency's money on military nuclear programs. In part, this was the
unavoidable result of the magnitude of the task of building the stockpile of nuclear
weapons, which was regarded as the keystone of the nation's defense program during
the 1950s.
,~ Significantly, the AEC's military tilt was also the result of a deliberate political
choice. The agency's most powerful head during the Eisenhower administration, Lewis
Strauss, believed that the job of developing "atoms for peace" was primarily the respon-
sibility of private industry. The technical and managerial resources of private industry
were, however, being similarly strained by the demands of military nuclear projects.
For instance, the first power-producing nuclear reactors were developed by private
industry for the United States Navy in order to propel submarines.
The military origins of United States nuclear reactor technology had two important
consequences. First, the reactors themselves were designed for use by the Navy's
highly trained and highly motivated operators but were not necessarily ideal for com-
mercial use by electric power industry personnel. The second consequence was that the
companies who developed and manufactured reactors for the United States Navy were,
quite understandably, eager to capitalize on their knowledge and experience in the much
more lucrative civilian market. By the early 1960s, the reactor manufacturers had modi-
fied the design of their naval reactors and began to aggressively market this new, and
largely untested, product to their long-standing customers in the electric utility industry.
The nature of the commercial relationship between the reactor manufacturers and the
electric power companies is an important element in the story of United States nuclear
power. General manufacturers had provided technological leadership to the electric util-
ity industry for decades. Their customers respected them and substantially lacked the
ability to verify or even to question them on many technical matters. The manufac-
turer's new—and in reality, highly novel—products were advertised and purchased as
merely a relatively modest modification to existing and well-understood electricity-
generating technology. Nuclear power plants, it was clear, were not revolutionary; they
were simply a cheaper alternative to heat water to make steam-driven conventional elec-
tric turbines.
Moreover, the first commercial sales of these nuclear steam supply systems were
made with prices guaranteed at levels that made them "loss leaders": merchandise ini-
tially sold at or below cost in the expectation that a demonstration effect would cause
additional customers to flock to the sales office and pay higher prices later on. This
marketing strategy was extremely successful. By 1966, less than three years after the
first loss leader sales, a bandwagon market for reactors had developed across the entire
United States, with electric utility executives all but stumbling over one another in their
rush to own their industry's new symbol of technological progress.
Meanwhile, the government agency that was supposed to be in control, if not in
charge, of developing cheap, reliable, and safe civilian nuclear technology, was simply
a passive observer. During the crucial mid-1960s period of initial reactor commercial-
ization, the AEC's activity in the new nuclear marketplace was essentially limited to
reprinting the manufacturers' advertisements under official covers, giving the reactors
the cachet of authoritative verification. But this was by no means the limit of the AEC's
failure during the mid-1960s. Its leaders committed other errors both of omission and
commission.
First, the AEC simply never took the job of regulating nuclear power seriously. Reg-
ulatory policy was explicitly based on the peculiar proposition that because nuclear tech-
nology was so obviously hazardous, the companies manufacturing and purchasing it
would regulate themselves. AEC officials assumed, in effect, that manufacturers would
design reactors that were "safe enough"; that construction companies would build them
according to rigid standards of quality control and quality assurance, and that utility
companies would operate them safely. The AEC defined its job as setting the basic 69
design, construction, and operating standards and then "spot checking," with a strong
presumption that these standards were being followed, to make sure that designers,
builders, and operators were doing what they were supposed to do.
In the early years of nuclear power, the AEC's reactor program was also flawed by
an important error of commission. Its scientific research program was almost totally
concentrated on a single technical characteristic of nuclear power plant design: the
efficiency with which reactors consumed uranium. What would turn out to be far more
commercially significant areas requiring research and development—radioactive waste
disposal; safe, as distinct from fuel-efficient, design; simplicity of operation; and a host
of others—were either ignored altogether or only meagerly supported.
Signs of deep trouble quickly appeared in the United States commercial reactor mar-
ketplace. By the late 1960s, it was evident that some of the economic promises of the
early years were not being kept. Nuclear power plants were costing roughly double
what had been estimated to build them. The manufacturers responded with a design
change that it was hoped would make reactors cheaper: they started to sell much bigger
plants with the idea, borrowed from experience elsewhere, of spreading the high fixed
costs of plant construction across larger units of output. By the early 1970s, utilities
were buying designs for nuclear plants that were up to six times larger than any that had
yet operated. Today, most executives in the utility industry concede that the explosively
rapid scale-up of designs fifteen years ago was a costly mistake.
A second and eventually more costly problem for the infant nuclear business came
from outside the closed circle of industry and government. Persons with no official con-
nection to government regulators or industry buyers and sellers began to claim that,
contrary to the assertions of all of the latter, nuclear power plants were not safe enough.
An essential element of opposition to nuclear power in this country is often ignored.
Effective opposition has always been based on technical arguments. During the latter
years of the 1960s, outsiders began to ask specific technical questions about reactor
design and operating characteristics. And, from the first, they had the better of the argu-
ment over the questions they raised.
The watershed event was an eighteen-month public hearing held, at the insistence of
outsiders, by the AEC in 1972 and 1973. At issue was the adequacy of the "Emergency
Core Cooling System" (ECCS) for preventing a catastrophic accident to a pressurized
water reactor. After the hearing, which lasted 125 days, AEC regulations were revised,
vindicating the outsiders' claims that there were defects in the design of the reactors
that utilities had rushed to buy during the preceding ten years. Prior to the ECCS hear-
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ing, opposition to nuclear power was limited to local challenges to specific projects.
Afterward, the issue became the inherent safety of the dozens of reactors then in oper-
ation and under construction, and hence, the basic social acceptability of contemporary
nuclear power technology.
More specifically, the ECCS controversy caused the first of many expensive rede-
signs of commercial nuclear power plants, each with the purpose of making reactors
still safer. Currently, this process continues and is the basic reason that the average cost
of nuclear plants completed today is higher than the average cost of plants completed in
the 1970s. United States nuclear power plants have been continually redesigned in an
effort to make them comply with established safety measures and developing safety
concerns. Each design change has increased the cost of the final product. Today, the
fundamental point of disagreement between the nuclear industry and its outside critics is
70 whether current designs and standards are "safe enough." There is little prospect that
the argument will be resolved for at least several years, until considerably more oper-
ating experience is gained with the redesigned plants, both here and abroad, that have
entered service only recently. But the weight of empirical evidence does now appear to
be accumulating on the side of those who insist that today's designs are, indeed, safe
enough.
Ironically, perhaps the most persuasive empirical evidence about the inherent safety
of today's reactor designs comes from the April 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. For
a large fraction of the American public, this accident seemed to be the definitive vindi-
cation of the claims of persons who had been fighting the nuclear industry. Something
that was supposed to be impossible, a catastrophic accident to a large, modern nuclear
power plant, had, apparently, almost happened. The nuclear industry's assurance that
TMI had proved that reactors were safe, not unsafe, had a decidedly hollow ring. Yet
the perspective of time and distance has added credibility to this assurance, for it is now
clear that TMI confirmed some fundamental propositions about how nuclear reactors
would behave under extreme conditions that before the accident had only been proven
in theory. Nevertheless, it has also become increasingly clear that TMI was a true
watershed for nuclear power in the United States. All of the nuclear plants completed
and operating before the accident are now generating electricity that is relatively cheap.
The TMI accident caused a virtual two-year hiatus in the licensing of new nuclear
power plants for operation. It also caused some costly design changes to plants that
were partially built at the time of the accident. The combination of the delays, during a
period of unprecedentedly high interest rates, and the required design changes has meant
that nearly all plants still being built will produce relatively costly electricity. Many,
including Seabrook, will produce electricity that by any contemporary, reasonable stan-
dards is extremely expensive: two or three times the cost of electricity produced from
burning oil, unless oil-price increases exceed $75 per barrel. 8
By the end of 1980, it should have been evident to PSNH management that during
Seabrook 's first few years of operation, the plant would mean more, not less, expensive
electricity to its customers. It is true that 1980 was a year of deep pessimism among
nearly all energy experts about the probable cost of oil during the late 1980s and 1990s.
In 1980 it was not necessarily foolish to suppose that, even at a total cost of $5.25 bil-
lion, Seabrook might produce relatively economical electricity in the 1990s, assuming
that the price of oil reached the levels of $100 per barrel that most experts were then
predicting. Yet the key point remains—PSNH management was literally risking their
company as a going business concern for arguable benefits.
Today Seabrook is an unqualified catastrophe. If unit #1 is completed and all or
most of its costs are passed along to New England electricity consumers in the form of
substantial annual rate increases— 10 to 20 percent—for several consecutive years, there
is only a small chance that those costs will be offset by future benefits to different cus-
tomers. Moreover, there are several clearly more economic alternatives to Seabrook'
s
expensive electricity. It is still in the interests of PSNH and the other owners' customers
to abandon Seabrook. Unhappily, because of the investments made in the project since
1980, Seabrook 's cancellation today, without substantial cost recovery from customers,
could mean the end of PSNH as a going business concern and the loss of hundreds of
millions of dollars for the company's bondholders and creditors. The company's failure
to cancel Seabrook by 1981 was devastating: it was precisely the kind of company-
wrecking mistake that top management has the ineluctable responsibility to avoid.
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